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Abstract— Merging in the form of a mandatory lane-change is an 
important issue in transportation research. Even when safely 
completed, merging may disturb the mainline traffic and reduce 
the efficiency or capacity of the roadway.  In this paper, we 
consider a Stackelberg game-theoretic driver behavior model 
where the so-called utilities or payoffs reflect the merging vehicle’s 
aggressiveness as it pertains the decision to merge as the situation 
stands or to accelerate/decelerate prior to the actual lane-change 
maneuver. The interaction of the merging vehicle with the 
mainline traffic is also considered whereby the combination of 
aggressiveness of the respective vehicles leads to both longitudinal 
and lateral disturbances to the mainline flow as well as subsequent 
reduction in the roadway throughput. The present study shows in 
semi-quantitative form that this impact depends on the level of 
aggressiveness of the merging and mainline vehicles in an intuitive 
manner, leading to the potential use of this model in traffic flow 
analysis and autonomous driving. 
Index Terms—Naturalistic driving models, lane-changing 
maneuvers, merging behavior, roadway safety. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Roadway congestion impacts the quality of life in 
metropolitan areas and as such is a major concern in traffic 
engineering. A variety of factors contribute to roadway 
congestion but improper lane-changing, be it in discretionary 
mode or in the mandatory case, as in merging onto the mainline 
of a highway, is one of the key factors that impacts roadway 
congestion by disturbing the mainline traffic flow. In the worst 
case, improper merging causes accidents that, aside from their 
unfortunate impact on those immediately involved, can have 
drastic impact on traffic. Improper merging itself has multiple 
causes, including driver inexperience or inattentiveness to the 
roadway configuration and traffic setting. 
In particular, willful or inherent aggressiveness is known to 
lead to improper merging behavior [1].  However, few studies 
have quantified the impact of aggressiveness (or related factors) 
on merging and its overall impact on traffic flow. To be sure, 
understanding human driving has been a major area of study in 
traffic engineering [2-8]. Several models have indeed been 
developed to delineate the human driving behavior [9-14], and 
which can be classified into longitudinal and lateral models.  
The latter, in particular, reveal the heuristics that characterize 
a driver’s lane change or merging behavior [15-18]. An 
aggressive disposition is a notable factor in this respect with the 
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extreme case of road rage often cited as a particular threat to 
traffic safety [19, 20]. To this end, and as part of a longer study, 
we have proposed a highway driving model [21] that uses 
Stackelberg game theory [22] to model drive behavior in 
discretionary lane changes as a function of driver 
aggressiveness. This work represents an extension of our prior 
work to the merging situation and builds on works by others on 
the same topic as referenced below. 
A. Brief Survey of Pertinent Literature 
As noted earlier, lane-changing behavior has also been 
actively studied by a number of researchers [15, 23-25]. Gipps 
[15], for instance, defined a set of factors that cause the driver 
to change lanes, including headway, speed and proximity to the 
desired exit ramp. Ahmed [23], among others, has utilized a gap 
acceptance model for discretionary lane-changing purposes. 
Likewise, Hidas [24] has proposed the notion of driver 
courtesy, a type of cooperation among drivers, in modeling 
lane-change and merging operations. Kim [25] has proposed a 
modified IDM (Intelligent Drier Model) to deal with conflicts 
among a group of vehicles and is, in  this respect, similar to 
Hidas’s driver courtesy scheme.  
In addition, Swaroop and Yoon have developed an 
emergency lane-change maneuver within the overall 
framework of vehicle platooning [26] while Jula et al. have 
considered a minimum longitudinal spacing criterion to avoid 
crashes [27]. Kanaris and Ioannou have also proposed a certain 
minimum safety spacing for lane-changing and merging in 
automated highway systems [28].  Hall and Tsao [29] studied 
merging algorithms for autonomous vehicles, cooperative 
vehicles, and cooperative platooning [30].  Mine and Mimura 
studied the merging model with an acceleration area in relation 
to the probability density function of the delay in the mainline 
traffic flow [31]. Wang and et al. studied a proactive merging 
algorithm that adjusts the velocity of the ramp car prior to 
merging [32]. 
On the other hand, Bose and Ioannou [33] showed that the 
disturbance from merging to the mainline traffic can be 
analyzed using a linear car following model (as for instance 
discussed by Pipes [34].) In particular, it is well known that a 
small delay at one point can lead to severe congestion upstream, 
often referred to as the slinky effect or string instability [35]. 
We will show later in this work that this initial disturbance is 
potentially the result of certain combinations of driving 
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behaviors that may originate in driver aggressiveness (including 
an overly cautious disposition) during the merging operation. 
B. Game Theory in Transportation 
Game theory has been applied in various ways to study the 
effects of policy, decisions, and/or the actions of individual 
agents in a transportation system. These studies can be broadly 
classified into two categories: infrastructural regulation studies 
(traffic control problem) and agent-oriented studies (vehicle 
placement or route decisions). In the first category, researchers 
have employed game theory in relation to dynamic traffic 
control or assignment problems. For instance, Chen and Ben-
Akiva [36] adopted a non-cooperative game model to study the 
interaction between a traffic regulation system and traffic flow 
to optimally regulate the flow on a highway or an intersection 
while Zheng-Long and De-Wang [37] addressed the ramp-
metering problem via Stackelberg game theory. Su et al. [38] 
have also used game theory to simulate the evolution of a traffic 
network.  
In the second category, vehicles are regarded as game 
participants and traffic rules are generally considered to be 
implicit in the respective decision models [39-41]. In this 
context Kita [42] has worked to address the merging-giveway 
interaction between a through car and a merging car as a two-
person non-zero sum game. This approach can be regarded as a 
game theoretic interpretation of Hidas’ driver courtesy scheme 
[43] from the viewpoint that the vehicles share the payoffs or 
heuristics of the lane-changing process. This leads to a 
reasonable traffic model although the approach does not 
address the uncertainties resulting from the actions of other 
drivers.  In recent studies, Talebpour et al [44, 45] have 
considered the notion of incomplete information as part of the 
game formulation process and have developed a model that in 
certain respects addresses the aforementioned concern. 
Likewise, Altendorf and Flemisch flow [46] have developed a 
game theoretic model that addresses the issue of risk-taking by 
drivers and its impact on the traffic flow. Their study focuses 
on the cognitive aspects of this decision making process and its 
impact on traffic safety. Likewise, Wang, et al. [47] have used 
a differential game based controller to control a given vehicle’s 
car-following and lane-changing behavior while in [48], the 
authors have applied an Iterative Snow-Drift (ISD) game on 
cross-a-crossing scenario. In [49], Stackelberg game theory 
was used solve conflicts in shared space zones while in [50] the 
authors compared heavy vehicle and passenger car lane-
changing maneuvers on arterial roads and freeways. Elvik [51] 
offers a rather complete review of related works in this area, 
albeit up to 2014. 
C. Outline of the Current Work 
In view of the above remarks, and in the same context as the 
cited works, we develop a merging model via Stackelberg game 
theory. In particular, we focus on developing a model with the 
utilities or payoffs (in game-theoretic language) that originate 
from the drivers’ intentions and disposition. This model will 
determine the instant to merge and the related 
acceleration/deceleration behavior in view of the driver’s 
aggressiveness. The model is intended to simulate a spectrum 
of driver aggressiveness levels during highway merging 
maneuvers. We base this merging model on a highway driving 
model, which previously included discretionary lane-changing 
[21].  The extension to highway merging (alternatively 
mandatory lane-changing) is nontrivial, however, since it 
requires active consideration of multiple simultaneous games 
that involve the merging vehicle and alternate competing 
vehicles in the mainline traffic. This is in turn due to the fact 
that in a typical merging situation, the merging vehicle cannot 
be certain as to whether to accelerate and precede the 
immediately competing vehicle in the mainline or else await the 
passing of that vehicle and position itself behind that vehicle 
(and ahead of the next competing vehicle). In the sequel, this 
point is discussed at more length and its impact in terms of the 
longitudinal and lateral disturbances to the mainline traffic is 
elaborated. 
 The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the 
system configurations for the problem. Section III defines the 
game theoretic model for highway merging while the related 
case studies are presented in Section IV. The impact of the 
driver disposition (aggressiveness) in merging and its 
consequences on the mainline traffic is presented in Section V. 
Section VI presents a summary of the work and concludes the 
paper. 
II. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
In order to design and simulate a merging model, we endow 
a given vehicle with three functions: vicinity recognition, 
decision making, and manipulation of the vehicle as depicted in 
Figure 1. The vicinity recognition focuses on the information 
concerning the vehicles within the immediate environment of 
the subject vehicle. Based on this information, the subject 
vehicle (or the driver in it) makes a decision, and the decision 
is implemented in view of the vehicle dynamic model. This 
same principle is applicable to every vehicle involved in the 
simulation studies discussed below. 
 
 
Figure 1. System Configuration. 
A. Vehicle Dynamic Model 
 A two-wheel vehicle model [52] given in (1.1) and the 
kinematic relations in (1.2) is schematically depicted in Figure 
2. This model describes the vehicle pose (x, y, θ) according to 
its velocity, v, and steering angle, δ , which are determined by 
the vehicle manipulation controllers: 
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Figure 2. Planar view of vehicle. 
  
 (1.1) 
   (1.2) 
where θ denotes the heading angle of the vehicle, (x,y) the 
position of the vehicle in the Cartesian coordinate system 
shown in the figure, r the yaw velocity, vlat the lateral velocity, 
m the mass of the vehicle, Iz its moment of inertia, vlong its 
longitudinal velocity, vlat its lateral velocity, lf the distance 
between the front wheel and the center of mass of the vehicle, 
lr the distance between the rear wheel and its center of mass, 
Cαf its front cornering stiffness, and Cαr its rear cornering 
stiffness. 
B. Driver’s Manipulation of the Vehicle 
To generate proper acceleration/deceleration and steering 
angle, we use two independent controllers for longitudinal and 
lateral control of the vehicle in a manner that we believe to be 
consistent with human driving. Both controllers (Proportional 
plus Derivative or PD) are used to control the relative velocity 
or the headway and the steering angle. The longitudinal control 
output, the resultant acceleration, is determined by the weighted 
mean of the two controls of the relative velocity and the 
headway. Both control outputs are limited by physical 
constraints of the vehicle and the driver’s disposition. In 
particular, an aggressive driver will move more drastically in 
the longitudinal and lateral directions than a normal or cautious 
driver. Thus, the vehicle acceleration a is given by 
   (1.3) 
where ev,d is the error between the reference velocity and the 
velocity of the vehicle or the error between the reference 
relative distance and the relative distance between the given 
vehicle and the vehicle ahead, Kpg is the proportional gain of the 
longitudinal controller, Kdg is the derivative gain of the 
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1 This diagram shows the generic configuration for vicinity recognition and 
will be specialized to the merging situation shortly. 
longitudinal controller, gl is the acceleration limit that can be 
changed by the driver’s disposition, and gpl is the physical 
limitation of acceleration or deceleration. Likewise, the steering 
angle is defined by 
   (1.4) 
where elat is the error between the reference lateral position and 
the lateral position of the vehicle, Kpl is the proportional gain of 
the lateral controller, Kdl is the derivative gain of the 
longitudinal controller, δlat is the steering angle limit that can be 
altered by the driver’s disposition, and δpl is the physical 
limitation of the steering angle. Here, δlat can be obtained by 
using the following ratio which is known as lateral acceleration 
gain [53]: 
   (1.5) 
where ayl denotes the lateral acceleration limit that can be 
changed by the driver’s disposition, L is the wheelbase, Kus is 
the understeer gradient of the vehicle, and g is the acceleration 
of gravity. 
C. Vicinity Recognition and Characterization 
1. Characterization of surrounding vehicles  
This function first classifies the given vehicle’s surroundings 
into vehicles ahead and those behind according to their 
longitudinal positions with respect to each lane. Here, the 
vehicles ahead and behind are called the leading and following 
vehicles, respectively. Then the nearest vehicles in each lane 
are chosen as the vicinity vehicles as depicted in a generic form1 
in Figure 3, where ① designates the vehicle itself, ② the 
leading vehicle in Lane 1,  ③ the following vehicle in Lane 1, 
④ the leading vehicle in Lane 2, ⑤ the leading vehicle in Lane 
3, and ⑥ the following vehicle in Lane 3. We will add artificial 
errors to approximate the uncertainty in recognizing the 
surroundings according to the driver’s disposition as described 
below. 
 
 
Figure 3. Vicinity vehicles in generic form. 
2. Driver reaction consideration 
Driver reaction time and poor prediction of other vehicles’ 
actions are crucial factors in transportation [54-57]. To 
incorporate these in our study, we consider the delayed 
recognition of the presence of other vehicles and late reaction 
to their presence. In particular, we consider the decision 
maker’s recognition point that is used to identify the lanes 
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occupied by various vehicles as depicted in Panel (a) of Figure 
4. It is assumed that the magnification ratio of the rectangle 
surrounding the intruding vehicle varies from 1 to 1.32 as a 
function of driver aggressiveness, , to be elaborated 
shortly, as depicted in Panel (b) of the figure.  
 
 
Figure 4.  Boundary recognition response. 
3. Collision detection 
 Vehicles are assumed to be rectangles that have certain 
widths and lengths. Thus, collision between any two vehicles 
can be detected in terms of the overlapping area between the 
projections of these rectangles using the Separating Axis 
Theorem [58] as depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Schematic view of Separating Axis Theorem. 
To formulate an index  to represent the collision 
possibility, we use the gaps between two rectangles along the 
separating axis. 
__________________________________________________ 
2 This value can be set appropriately without impacting the underlying 
principle.  
  (1.6) 
where Dproj denotes the gaps along the separating axis, vi a 
vector defining the rectangle, and v the vector to the opposite 
corner. We define the collision possibility index, , 
as the exponential inverse of the gap. 
  (1.7) 
where 
 . (1.8) 
 is defined in a similar manner. Note that the collision 
possibility index is 1 when two rectangles overlap and 0 when 
the gap between them approaches infinity. 
III. GAME FORMULATION 
With the above in mind, we configure a straight road with 
one merging lane as depicted in Figure 6. The assumption is 
that the entry ramp (or the merge lane) has an 
entrance/acceleration area for merging, and can be viewed as an 
additional lane on the roadway that only the merging vehicles 
occupy3. In the mainline, there are two kinds of vehicles: 
vehicles with decision makers and vehicles that just move at 
preset speeds (not all the same) without changing lanes. The 
latter (shown in blue) form the boundaries of the simulation. 
 
Figure 6. Problem space. 
Figure 1.  Game Definition 
We assume a typical merging situation and first establish a 
3 It is not entirely inconceivable for mainline vehicles to temporarily 
transition to the merging lane, which may happen in rare circumstances, but this 
is not the purpose of the merging lane. 
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Stackelberg game between the merging vehicle ( ) and the 
immediately preceding (or competing) vehicle in the mainline 
( ) as depicted in Figure 6. This happens in a situation when 
the merging vehicle, , is generally well positioned to 
manuever into the mainline although even in this circumstance 
its relative longitudinal position with respect to the mainline 
vehicle, , and their relative speeds impacts the decision by 
 whether to proceed with the merging manuever. This 
decision requires a game-therotic analysis that considers the 
highlighted factors along with aggressivenss of each vehicle in 
terms of a set of payoffs or utilities that are defined shortly. 
In general, the decision to merge is not as straighforward as 
it may appear from the above discussion and the diagram in 
Figure 6.  It is entirely possible, and even likley that the merging 
vehicle would consider options other than to merge 
immediately. For instance, depending on its own aggressivenss 
or the perceived threat from the competing vehicle in the 
mainline, , it may decide to accelerate to move well ahead 
of , possibly positioning itself even ahead of the vehicle that 
leads  in the mainline, i.e.  as depicted in Figure 7 or 
declerating to merge behind  in which case it will compete 
with vehicle immediately behind , which is also denoted by 
 in the figure4.  
 
Figure 7. The merging situation and alternate competing vehicles. 
Next, we formulate two parallel games for the respective 
purposes. A merging game, determines the merging point of the 
ramp vehicle based on the current information concerning the 
competing vehicles as depicted earlier in Figure 6. If the 
decision is to merge, then the ramp vehicle proceeds 
accordingly. However, if the decision is not to merge 
immediately, the ramp vehicle must decide whether it should 
accelerate or decelerate to achieve its objective of merging into 
the mainline. The acceleration less than 0.1 g does not cause 
passengers to feel discomfort and can be maximally 0.3 g for 
normal operation [59]. The prediced future positions of the 
respective vehicles (in conjunction with the payoffs associated 
with the various strategies) determine which vehicle in the 
mainline would be the co-participant in the eventual merging 
game as depicted in Figure 7. 
In either case, the merging vehicle, , considers a 2-player 
__________________________________________________ 
4 Note that regardless of whether the merging vehicle accelerates or 
decelerates, the new competing vehicle is denoted by  in the figure for 
simplicity albeit at the expense of some abuse of notation. 
5 We use  as the generic label to refer to the competing vehicle in the 
mainline from this point onwards. 
Stackelberg game with , i.e. the vehicle in the mainline5, 
which may itself be simultaneously involved in another game 
with preceding vehicles in its adjacent lanes [21]. This 
interaction impacts the interplay of  with the merging 
vehicle, , since the decision by  does depend on the 
behavior of the competing vehicle, which in turn depends on its 
interaction with other vehicles in the mainline.  We do not, 
however, factor in a second order effect that may be involved, 
i.e. the merging vehicle does not consider anything more than 
what the merging vehicle does and not why it may do so. Thus, 
the Stackelerg game is defined as  
   
   
   
where  is the action set of going left, , and going 
straight, . Going left or going straight may be understood as 
merging in or staying in the merge lane, respectively, for the 
merging vehicle and as denying or yielding the right of way by 
the mainline vehicle6.  
The acceleration/deceleration game has the same solution 
candidates as the merging game: merging in or staying in the 
merge lane. Yet these do not literally mean immediately 
merging or staying in the merge lane. For example, the solution 
to merge in, of the game with an assumption of deceleration, 
means that if the vehicle decelerates, it may join the mainline. 
Notice that joining the mainline cannot be guaranteed but 
predicted to be possible. The same idea applies to the 
acceleration case. Thus in the example shown in Figure 7, we 
have two decisions: merging ahead of  or merging in 
against either vehicle marked as , in which case  does 
not merge in immediately but will accelerate/decelerate first 
and then executes a merging maneuver. Consequently, at that 
point, takes the place of  in the merging game. Figure 
8 shows the flowchart of the respective games. 
A. Utility Design 
We define two utility functions, a positive utility and a 
negative utility as described below. Both the merging and 
acceleration games use the same utility functions. However, as 
stated previously, inputs for the respective utility functions are 
different in these case; they use current and predicted 
information respectively. These utility functions are designed 
to be adjusted by the drivers’ disposition defined by the index 
, which reflects the aggressiveness of a given driver; 
 defines a completely cautious driver,   denotes a 
completely aggressive driver, while a nominally normal driver 
is ascribed an aggressiveness index of .  
6 Note that going straight by the mainline vehicle is not an automatic denial 
of the right of way to the merging vehicle. Whether the merging vehicle 
perceives it as such depends on the outcome of the game-theoretic analysis, 
which as we see shortly refers to the inter-vehicular distances and the level of 
aggressiveness or risk-taking by the merging vehicle. 
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1. Utility due to headway 
A basic assumption is that ordinarily drivers wish to have an 
appropriate headway ahead of them. This is both a matter of 
safety7 and a matter of desire for free space to maneuver at will. 
The utility function associated with this idea is defined by 
   (1.9) 
where dr  is the headway distance (distance between the subject 
vehicle and the vehicle ahead), dv denotes the visibility distance 
for a normal driver; α(q) modifies dv as a function of driver 
aggressiveness as depicted in Panel (a) of Figure 9. 
 
Figure 8. Relationship between the two Stackelberg games. 
Note that this utility measure can be quantified relative to the 
current lane or relative to any target lane to the left or right side 
of the current lane as further discussed below. 
 
Figure 9.  Definitions of visibility range index (a) and prediction 
time (b) as a function of aggressiveness. 
2. Utility to achieve a safe lane change 
There are two choices for the merging vehicle: merging-in 
and staying in the merge lane. Merging puts the vehicle in 
contention with the immediately preceding vehicle in the 
mainline. On the other hand, failure to merge is generally not 
an option as the given vehicle approaches the end of the merge 
lane. The utilities for the two strategies (Uneg,L for merging or 
going left and Uneg,S for staying in the same lane) are 
respectively defined by  
__________________________________________________ 
7 Typical rule is 3 seconds, which translates into approximately 300 ft at 
typical highway speed. 
   (1.10) 
  
 (1.11) 
where dr and vr  denote the relative distance and velocity 
between the given vehicle and the vehicle behind in the adjacent 
lane, respectively. In addition, T(q) designates the prediction 
time, de the distance to the end of the merge lane, and Dsuf the 
distance essential to change lanes: e.g. an appropriate multiple 
of the diagonal length of the vehicle. Time headway of highway 
drivers [54] is used for the prediction time. The prediction time 
varies according to the driver’s aggressiveness, q, as shown in 
Panel b of Figure 9. An aggressive driver has the minimum 
value among the time headway variations of highway drivers 
and vice versa. In general, aggressive drivers tend to change 
lanes or merge in even if the headway between the given vehicle 
and the target is comparatively small and, conversely, the 
prerequisite spacing to merge is larger for unaccustomed or 
cautious drivers. 
B. Solution of the Stackelberg Game 
The solution (γ1*, γ2*) of the 2-player Stackelberg game is 
obtained by (1.12) and (1.14): 
   (1.13) 
  
 (1.14) 
where 
   (1.15)
  
This solution is evaluated at preset periods to allow the 
vehicle to consider the dynamic situation that is common in 
driving. Note that the solution to a Stackelberg game always 
exists although it may not be unique [22]. The lack of 
uniqueness is readily remedied using the inherently safer 
decision should non-unique choices arise in the game theoretic 
analysis. 
IV. CASE STUDIES 
This section presents the process of evaluation of the above 
game theoretic model in two merging situations. The scenarios 
incorporate a vehicle with a driver of selectable aggressive 
disposition so as to study the impact of this factor on the overall 
driving situation. 
A. Test Scenarios 
We consider two different scenarios where there is a vehicle 
in the merging lane and five vehicles in the mainline as depicted 
in Figure 10. The merging vehicle incorporates the proposed 
game-theoretic decision model while the other five vehicles in 
the mainline move at preset speeds without changing lanes8. 
8 We will consider the interplay of vehicle in the next section in more detail. 
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Each scenario is designed to provide the merging vehicle with 
an appropriate environment where merging is possible when the 
merging vehicle accelerates or decelerates respectively. We 
impose three different aggressiveness settings (cautious, 
normal, and aggressive) on the merging vehicle in each 
scenario. The merge entrance starts from 50 m in longitudinal 
direction and the length of the entrance is 100 m, with an 
extended 20m to complete the merge process. Lane 1, 2, and 3 
and the merge lane are set to x=0, 3.3, 6.6, and 9.9 m in the 
lateral direction as shown in Figure 10 and Tables I and II. 
 
Figure 10. Merging Scenarios. 
TABLE I.  TEST SCENARIO 1 
 
Initial conditions 
x0 (m) y0 (m) v0 (km/h) 
Vehicle 1 in the mainline 0 30 80 
Vehicle 2 in the mainline 3.3 30 80 
Vehicle 3 in the mainline 6.6 30 80 
Vehicle 4 in the mainline 6.6 5 80 
Vehicle 5 in the mainline 6.6 -10 80 
Merging Vehicle 9.9 10 70 
TABLE II.  TEST SCENARIO 2 
 
Initial conditions 
x0 (m) y0 (m) v0 (km/h) 
Vehicle 1 in the mainline 0 10 80 
Vehicle 2 in the mainline 3.3 10 80 
Vehicle 3 in the mainline 6.6 10 80 
Vehicle 4 in the mainline 6.6 5 80 
Vehicle 5 in the mainline 6.6 -10 80 
Merging Vehicle 9.9 0 70 
 
B. Case Study Results 
The results of the first scenario are depicted in Figure 11, 
Figure 12 and the top panel of Figure 13. The aggressive driver 
and the normal driver merge in while overtaking the competing 
vehicle (Vehicle 4) in the adjacent mainline as depicted in the 
bottom panel of Figure 11, whereas the cautious driver slows 
down to merge behind Vehicle 5 and moves further left to 
achieve a reasonable headway as shown in the same figure. 
Note that in the figure, the final position of the merging vehicle 
with three different aggressiveness levels (red, representing the 
aggressive vehicle, blue, the normal vehicle and black, the 
cautious vehicle) is superimposed on the same drawing for 
compactness of presentation but these cases are simulated 
separately.  
In reference to Figure 12, it is evident that the aggressive 
vehicle (identified by the solid red line) merges quickly as its 
lateral position indicates whereas the normal vehicle (identified 
by the blue dashed line) merges somewhat later in the process. 
The cautions driver (identified in black dot-dashed line) merges 
late and subsequently moves to the middle lane as stated earlier. 
The lateral vs. longitudinal positions of the vehicles studied 
in this scenario are depicted in the top panel of Figure 13. 
 
Figure 11. Initial and Final Positions in Scenario 1. 
 
Figure 12. The simulation results of the scenario 1. 
In above scenario, the behavior of the cautious vehicle is of 
some interest. It appears in both Figure 11 and Figure 12 to lag 
behind Vehicle 5 while merging and ends up in the middle lane 
subsequent to the merging process. This likely happens when 
the relative distance of the cautious merging vehicle with 
respect to Vehicle 5 is too small immediately following the 
merging process, causing the game theoretic model for highway 
driving that is programmed into the vehicle [21]  to produce a 
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discretionary lane change as depicted the aforementioned 
figures. The normal and aggressive vehicles, however, remain 
in the mainline lane where they merge since there is no 
advantage in shifting further to the left based on the payoffs 
defined in the game-theoretic model. Their longitudinal 
positions also reflect their behavioral dispositions in that the 
aggressive vehicle actually accelerates to increase its relative 
distance with respect to the competing mainline vehicle while 
the normal vehicle slows down slightly. 
 
Figure 13. Lateral vs. Longitudinal positions. 
The results of the second scenario are depicted in the bottom 
panel of Figure 13 and in Figure 14 and Figure 15. Note that 
once again, in Figure 14, the final position of the merging 
vehicle with three aggressiveness levels (red, representing the 
aggressive vehicle, blue, the normal vehicle and black, the 
cautious vehicle) is superimposed on the same drawing in 
bottom panel of the figure for compactness of presentation but 
these cases are simulated separately.  
 
Figure 14. Initial and Final Positions in Scenario 2. 
As the figures show, the aggressive driver will be too close 
behind Vehicle 4 as it merges into the rightmost lane, causing 
it to shift to the middle lane to improve its headway and thus 
positions itself behind Vehicle 2. The normal vehicle merges 
slightly later in the process, and would be too close behind 
Vehicle 5 as it does. It too seeks a better headway by switching 
to the middle lane. The cautious vehicle merges later than all 
others and appears to be safely behind Vehicle 5 at that point. 
However, there is still some advantage in performing a 
discretionary lane change [21] to the middle lane since it would 
achieve an even better headway as it is evident in the respective 
figures. 
 
Figure 15. The simulation results of Scenario 2 
V. INFLUENCES ON THE MAINLINE TRAFFIC 
In this section, we analyze the effects of merging on the 
mainline traffic. In the previous case studies, the focus was on 
the behavior of the merging vehicle while the vehicles in the 
mainline followed their respective lanes at preset speeds. In this 
section, we place a vehicle incorporating a game-theoretic 
driving model of its own [21]  in the adjacent mainline. This is 
to investigate the resulting disturbances to the mainline traffic 
as a function of the aggressiveness combinations of both the 
merging-in vehicle and the vehicle in the adjacent mainline as 
described below. 
A. Disturbance Types 
We consider two types of disturbances in the mainline traffic 
flow: longitudinal and lateral. The longitudinal disturbance, 
Dlong, is defined as the integration of the decelerated velocity of 
the vehicle in the adjacent mainline, which is brought about 
while the merging vehicle is entering the mainline. 
   (1.16) 
Even though the mainline vehicle can speed up following the 
completion of the merging process to follow the merging 
vehicle, the amount of pullback causes upstream vehicles to 
slow down as well, adversely affecting the mainline flow. The 
lateral disturbance is defined as the lateral movement due to the 
lane-changes of the vehicle in the adjacent mainline. This is to 
consider the possibility that the adjacent mainline vehicle may 
have to execute a lane change of its own to avoid collision with 
the merging vehicle. Such a lane change does not necessarily 
result in a slowing down of the mainline vehicle but the 
resulting lane-changes still impacts the upstream traffic since 
the vehicles in the other lanes may need to slow down to 
 
Dlong = max(v0 − v,0)∫ ⋅dt
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accommodate the respective vehicle. 
B. Longitudinal and lateral disturbances of the mainline 
Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the longitudinal and lateral 
disturbances in the mainline respectively, which are caused by 
the merging process. In particular, if the vehicle in the mainline 
is highly cautious (0% aggressiveness), the disturbances are 
minimized in both lateral and longitudinal directions when the 
merging vehicle maintains a normal aggressiveness level. This 
is intuitively reasonable in that the upstream traffic is not any 
worse off when a cautious mainline vehicle, ever so cautiously, 
accommodates a merging vehicle of normal aggressiveness 
since this behavior is already factored in the nominal upstream 
traffic flow. 
 
Figure 16. Longitudinal disturbance in the mainline. 
However, there appears to be a significant impact on the 
mainline flow if the merging vehicle is either very cautious or 
highly aggressive. This is due to the fact that a cautious 
mainline vehicle may slow down considerably to allow an 
overly cautious merging vehicle to merge and similarly react to 
a very aggressive vehicle, which merges quickly causing the 
mainline vehicle to slow down measurably or to change lanes 
or both, particularly since an aggressive merging vehicle may 
merge in a manner that would lead to very small headway for 
the mainline vehicle regardless of the latter’s disposition.  
If the vehicle in the mainline maintains a normal 
aggressiveness level (50% aggressiveness), the resulting 
longitudinal disturbance to the mainline traffic remains at a 
moderate level regardless of the mode of behavior of the 
merging vehicle; i.e. the normal vehicle may need to slow down 
some to accommodate any merging vehicle. On the other hand, 
the lateral disturbance is minimized when the merging vehicle 
is also normal, but increases considerably with either an 
increase or decrease in the aggressiveness of the merging 
vehicle. This is understandable given the impact that a very 
cautious merging vehicle or a very aggressive merging vehicle 
may have on the mainline traffic, causing a mainline vehicle of 
normal aggressiveness to potentially change lanes to 
accommodate either of these case. In summary, a normal 
mainline vehicle either slows down somewhat to accommodate 
any merging vehicle (as one might intuitively expect) or else 
changes lanes to deal with highly cautious or aggressive 
merging vehicles. In either case, there is an overall longitudinal 
disturbance that propagates through the upstream traffic. 
When the mainline vehicle is highly aggressive, it typically 
forces the merging vehicle to slow down and passes by the 
merging vehicle, or else changes lanes to accommodate a 
normal to aggressive vehicle. In either case, the merging vehicle 
typically designates a new competing vehicle relative to which 
it must maneuver to be able to merge into the mainline traffic. 
In that case, and unless the traffic density is high (which is not 
considered in this study), there would be sufficient spacing for 
the merging vehicle to safely complete its task. 
The resulting longitudinal disturbance is therefore relatively 
modest but the lateral disturbance can be significant as depicted 
below. The interesting case may be the interaction between an 
aggressive mainline vehicle and a normal merging vehicle, 
which accommodates the mainline vehicle and merges without 
either significantly disturbing the mainline traffic in the 
longitudinal or lateral directions.  
 
Figure 17. Lateral disturbance in the mainline. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we considered a merging model based on the 
2-person Stackelberg game. We designed two different games 
for the merging vehicle to determine the merging point and 
acceleration/deceleration strategy. The results indicate that 
merging vehicles of different levels of aggressiveness do in fact 
accomplish their merging objective albeit in different ways 
(some involving additional discretionary lane changes).   
We further combined the proposed merging model with the 
previously developed highway driving model for discretionary 
lane changes to further investigate the effects of merging on the 
mainline traffic. When the vehicle in the mainline is highly 
cautious, both lateral and longitudinal disturbances are 
minimized when the merging vehicle maintains a normal 
aggressiveness level. However, there appears to be a significant 
impact on the mainline traffic if the merging vehicle is either 
very cautious or highly aggressive. When the vehicle in the 
mainline maintains a normal aggressive level, the resulting 
longitudinal disturbance to the mainline traffic remains at a 
moderate level, regardless of the mode of behavior of the 
merging vehicle. Finally, when the mainline vehicle is highly 
aggressive, the resulting and immediate longitudinal 
disturbance is relatively modest but the lateral disturbance can 
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be significant. In all, the results appear to be intuitive even if in 
certain cases, the intuition may not fully capture the detailed 
behavior manifested in the scenarios presented here. 
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